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SUMMARY
This paper examines the quality of credit ratings assigned to banks by the three
largest rating agencies. We interpret credit ratings as relative assessments of credit-
worthiness, and define a new ordinal metric of rating error based on banks’
expected default frequencies. Our results suggest that on average large banks receive
more positive bank ratings, particularly from the agency to which the bank pro-
vides substantial securitization business. These competitive distortions are econom-
ically significant and contribute to perpetuate the existence of ‘too-big-to-fail’
banks. We also show that, overall, differential risk weights recommended by the
Basel accords for investment grade banks bear no significant relationship to empir-
ical default probabilities.
—Harald Hau, Sam Langfield and David Marques-Ibanez
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the initial phase of the financial crisis in 2007–2008, popular indig-
nation often focused on credit ratings assigned to banks: most failing banks enjoyed
investment grade status shortly before defaulting. Ratings of products sold by banks,
such as securitized credit, were also found wanting. Ratings were subject to particu-
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larly sharp criticism since they are supposed to evaluate default risk over the economic
cycle. These cumulative mistakes conveyed the impression that the entire rating sys-
tem was flawed, along with large parts of the prudential regulation of banks, which
relies heavily on credit ratings.
We pursue three objectives. First, we provide a comprehensive empirical measure-
ment of the quality of banks’ ratings over the past 20 years based on a new ordinal
metric of rating error. Our method interprets bank credit ratings in a strictly ordinal
manner: banks are ranked by their credit rating; and this ranking is then compared to
a second ranking of expected default frequencies two years later. The difference
between these two ranks is then defined as the Ordinal Rating Quality Shortfall (ORQS).
The ranking procedure provides a good measure of rating quality, because it only
requires ratings to be consistent over time. A higher credit rating must correspond to
lower default risk, but not to any particular quantity of default risk. Thus, an ordinal
rating metric may remain accurate even with the dramatic increases in cardinal
default probabilities observed during financial crises. Second, we use this non-para-
metric rating quality measure for a structural analysis into the determinants of rating
quality. In particular, we examine the role of various bank characteristics on rating
quality and rating bias in order to unveil their potential causes. Third, we discuss the
policy conclusions of our evidence and outline the most promising policy option to
improve bank rating quality.
Any analysis of rating quality faces the question, what is the meaning of a credit rat-
ing? Literature published by the rating agencies themselves is testimony to consider-
able confusion. Moody’s Rating Methodology (1999) states that ‘one of Moody’s goals is
to achieve stable expected default rates across rating categories’, which suggests that
ratings are absolute or cardinal measures of future default. By contrast, other docu-
ments characterize Moody’s credit ratings as ‘ordinal measures’ (Moody’s, 2006). State-
ments by other rating agencies are similarly contradictory about the cardinal versus
ordinal interpretation of credit ratings.
A cardinal rating for banks requires rating agencies to predict bank distress in
normal times as well as during generalized banking crises, whereas ordinal ratings
only assess banks’ relative creditworthiness. Our evaluation of bank rating quality
adopts the weaker ordinal standard. Our intention is not to hold rating agencies to an
unreasonable standard of absolute accuracy over time, but only to a much weaker
requirement of cross-sectional consistency in their bank rankings.
Our analysis draws on a large and comprehensive dataset of bank ratings from the
three major rating agencies. The data on credit ratings are combined with yearly
accounting balance sheet information on rated banks and monthly expected default
frequencies (EDFs) from those banks obtained from Moody’s KMV. In total, our data-
set has 38,753 bank-rating observations at quarterly frequency over the period rang-
ing from 1990 to 2011. By using EDFs calculated by Moody’s as a measure of risk,
we maintain methodological fairness by avoiding subjective risk modelling choices
(see Section 4). EDFs capture perceptions of bank risk derived from a structural model
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incorporating expectations from equity markets. Moreover, unlike some other indica-
tors of bank risk, EDFs are observed in relation to individual banks over a long time
series.
To illustrate the advantage of an ordinal (non-parametric) analysis, consider the
evolution of EDFs for our sample banks depicted in Figure 1. The left-skewed dis-
tribution shows a spike at the high quantiles of bank credit risk from 2008. Short
of predicting the financial crisis, credit ratings are unlikely to capture such enorm-
ous fluctuations in bank credit risk. Any cardinal measure of rating quality would
therefore be strongly tainted by the unpredictability of the crisis itself. By contrast,
our strictly rank-based measure of rating quality is not altered by a shift in the dis-
tribution of expected default frequencies, as long as the rank ordering remains
unchanged.
Our analysis provides a rich set of empirical insights into the structure and the
determinants of credit rating quality. First, we find that ordinal rating quality is coun-
tercyclical. With the onset of a banking crisis, the (ordinal) information content of
credit ratings increases. In normal times, bank credit ratings are informative about
future expected default probabilities only for the 25% lowest-rated banks with ratings
of BBB+ and below, but not for investment grades above BBB+. Unconditionally, our
results suggest that an A-rated bank is as likely to become distressed as an AAA-rated
institution.
Second, bank characteristics significantly influence bank rating quality. A tradi-
tional banking model with a large loan share increases the accuracy of the credit
rating. Bank size strongly correlates with more favourable ratings. This rating bias in
favour of large banks is economically significant. An increase in the size of a bank by
two standard deviations implies that the credit rating rank relative to the EDF rank is
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Boxplot: Banks' Expected Default Frequencies
Figure 1. Moody’s KMV one-year expected default frequencies (EDFTM)
Notes: Graph shows the EDFs of the 369 banks in our unbalanced panel. In the boxplot, the median EDF is given
by the horizontal line inside the box. The box contains observations on EDFs at the 25th and 75th percentiles.
Adjacent values are the most extreme observations within 1.5 interquartile ranges of the nearest quartile. Values
outside of these ranges are not shown in the graph.
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overestimated by 15 positions for every 100 banks in the sample. This corresponds,
for example, to an unwarranted rating improvement from A- to A, which on average
equates to a financing cost decrease of 40 basis points.
Third, our results suggest that there are conflicts of interest between banks and rat-
ing agencies that alter the rating process. Using additional data on banks’ agency-
specific securitization business, we find that rating agencies give systematically better
ratings to banks that provide an agency with a large quantity of business in the form
of rating asset-backed securities.
Fourth, multiple bank ratings by different rating agencies correlate with less favour-
able ratings relative to future EDFs. This finding casts some doubt on the assertion
that rating competition fosters rating inflation through ‘ratings shopping’.
These empirical insights lead us to a number of policy conclusions, which we sum-
marize as follows:
1. The strong discrimination of credit risk within the investment grade category (as
maintained under Basel II and Basel III) cannot be reconciled with our evidence
on empirical bank default probabilities. Taken at face value, our results suggest
that all investment grade bank ratings above A- deserve the same risk weight, at
least with respect to bank ratings.
2. Rating agencies systematically assign more favourable ratings to larger banks and
to those institutions that provide the respective rating agency with additional rat-
ing business in the private structured credit markets. These results are in line with
the ‘too big to fail’ problem and can lead to competitive distortions. As a result, an
increase in supervisory intensity for large banks is warranted.
3. The generally low information content of bank ratings implies that punitive meas-
ures for (ex-post) rating failures cannot be translated into a workable policy frame-
work. The hope that the incentives of rating agencies will change if investors pay
directly for ratings seems similarly misplaced, in view of buy-side investors’
demand for inflated ratings (Calomiris, 2009).
4. Given the strong negative externalities of bank opacity, a promising policy option
lies in enhanced transparency of banks. Substantial improvement of banks’ public
disclosure with granular reporting of risk positions seems warranted. A related
insight concerns heterogeneity in accounting practices across countries, which
compounds incentive problems due to bank opacity, leading to costly delays in the
recognition of banking problems.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the motivation of our
focus on bank ratings. Section 3 describes the literature on credit ratings, while
Section 4 explains the data sources. Section 5 presents the methodology and Section
6 discusses the main hypotheses. Section 7 explains the regression results and
Section 8 robustness issues. The last section presents the main conclusions and policy
implications.
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2. WHY DO CREDIT RATINGS MATTER?
Investors’ reliance on credit ratings has increased over the past 30 years. Financial
transactions have grown in volume and complexity and finance has shifted from banks
to capital markets, particularly in the US (Boot and Thakor, 2010). At the same time,
deregulation and financial innovation – including securitization and credit derivatives
– have made the banking sector larger, more concentrated, more complex and more
closely connected with capital markets.
Acquiring information is costly, particularly for fixed income investors, given
collective action problems. Thus investors seek to outsource creditworthiness assess-
ments to rating agencies. More than half of all corporate bonds are held by institutions
subject to ratings-based investment restrictions (Bongaerts et al., 2012).
Bank ratings are a particularly important determinant of the issuance cost of
senior unsecured debt. Senior unsecured debt remains the largest source of long-
term funding for banks. Since 2007, new issuance of unsecured debt as a share
of total bank debt issuance has somewhat decreased, partly substituted by more
deposits and secured debt. Secured debt accounted for less than 30% of total
bank debt issuance in 2009; this figure had risen to 40% in the first half of 2012,
according to data from Dealogic. In the US and EU15, total bank debt issuance
amounted to approximately US$1,000 billion in 2011 – comprising US$442 bil-
lion of corporate bonds; US$134 billion of medium-term notes; US$116 billion of
short-term debt and US$362 billion of covered bonds. Thus, despite recent mar-
ginal changes in funding models, senior unsecured debt ratings remain an impor-
tant assessment of bank creditworthiness.
But compared to other corporations, banks pose a particular challenge for external
rating agencies. Banks are inherently opaque and exposed to a multiplicity of risks.
Bank business is characterized to a significant extent by asymmetries of information
and actual (and potential) regulatory interventions.1 We may therefore consider that
bank ratings provide a lower bound (or worst-case setting) for the quality of external
ratings compared to other corporate ratings (Morgan, 2002).
At the same time, banks’ central role in credit intermediation is important for effi-
cient allocations of capital and risk, and thus for activity in the real economy. The col-
lapse in credit supply during the financial crisis of 2008–2009 led to a long-lasting
reduction in the level of output relative to the pre-crisis trend (Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009; Campello et al., 2010). Publicly funded recapitalization and guarantees on
deposits and debt put pressure on the credibility of sovereigns’ signatures. These con-
siderations compound the economic importance of unbiased and efficient assessments
of bank creditworthiness.
1 This is best illustrated by the spectacular bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom – both of which failed
as ‘financial conglomerates’ rather than ordinary energy or telephone companies.
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The particular role of credit ratings in the financial system is enshrined in policy.
From 1936 onwards, regulatory authorities in the United States have, in many
instances, delegated oversight of the credit quality of banks’ portfolios to rating agen-
cies (White, 2010). For instance, in exchange for liquidity, central banks require a
minimum quality of collateral, defined in many cases by reference to credit ratings. In
the realm of prudential banking regulation, the Basel II accord increased regulatory
reliance on credit ratings. Under this agreement, minimum capital levels are specified
as a proportion of risk-weighted assets, where risk weights may be calculated using
credit ratings. Yet compared with the unweighted leverage ratio, there is no evidence
to suggest that the risk-weighted capital ratio is a superior predictor of bank failure
during crisis periods (Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2012). Moreover, anecdotal evid-
ence suggests that although large banks sometimes use internal models as a substitute
for credit ratings for their credit assessments, the internal models themselves often
tend to rely heavily on ratings for actual or methodological input. The Basel III agree-
ment expresses a broad intention to mitigate reliance on ratings of securitized loans,
but introduces an additional role for credit ratings with respect to counterparty credit
risk from over-the-counter derivatives (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS), 2010).
The performance of credit rating agencies has faced heightened scrutiny since the
onset of the financial crisis in 2007. The model of the credit rating agency industry –
to take private information, and a fee, from an issuer, and publish a summary
judgement in a rating, with special status conferred by public policy – has been
heavily criticized (Pagano and Volpin, 2010; Financial Stability Board, 2010). High
reliance on rating agencies increases the exposure of the financial system to the accu-
racy of ratings. Mistakes and biased forecasts have the potential to cause or exacerbate
crises, rendering the financial system more vulnerable to cliff effects (Manso, 2011).2
3. LITERATURE
Credit ratings play a key role in the financial system, but determinants of their quality
are poorly understood. There is scant empirical literature on bank credit ratings and
the quality of such ratings. This is surprising, since credit ratings potentially contain
information on banks’ riskiness that is not otherwise available to the market.
Agency and incentive problems are a central theme in the literature on credit rat-
ings. These agency problems arise in different forms. The majority of the research
focuses on the conflict between the ratings consumer (i.e. the financial investor) and
the issuer, who pays for the rating and has an incentive to lobby for positive bias from
the rating agency. This conflict sharpened in 1975, when credit rating agencies shifted
from an ‘investor pays’ to an ‘issuer pays’ model (White, 2010; Pagano and Volpin,
2 In the case of AIG, over-the-counter derivatives contracts provided for margin calls in the event of a rat-
ing downgrade of the underwriter, precipitating a vicious circle.
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2010). Under the latter model, issuers may credibly threaten to switch to a competing
agency, which could lead to positive rating bias referred to as ‘ratings shopping’. On
average, the larger the potential future business between rating agencies and their
clients, the larger an agency’s incentive to inflate ratings. Related analysis of struc-
tured debt ratings by Efing and Marques-Iba~nez (2012) indicates that issuers that
generate more rating business receive rating favours and benefit from lower yield
spreads, and that this mechanism was strongest at the height of the credit cycle in
2004–2006. Other research has focused on the power of rating agencies rather than
that of their clients. Rating agencies may issue downside-biased unsolicited ratings for
which no fee is charged, thus threatening credit issuers who do not solicit ratings (Part-
noy, 2002; Fulghieri et al., 2010). According to Griffin and Tang (2011), rating teams
that interact more closely with their clients produce more upwardly biased ratings
than those teams in the supervisory unit. Other evidence points to additional upward
bias in credit ratings of securities when the issuer is large, since issuer size is correlated
with the agency fee (He et al., 2011).
A second and more perilous incentive conflict may arise from rating-contingent
financial regulation of banks and other investors (i.e. the buy side) with agency prob-
lems of their own. As Calomiris (2009) highlights, rating inflation may arise from col-
lusion between rating agencies and security investors in the pursuit of regulatory
arbitrage, higher leverage and short-term profits. This could explain why such a large
quantity of collateralized assets with inflated ratings turned out to be on bank balance
sheets during the crisis. Opp et al. (2013) show that rating-contingent regulation can
significantly lower an agency’s incentives to acquire costly information and to produce
high-quality ratings. Investors do not scrutinize rated securities as they enjoy regulat-
ory benefits from inflated ratings. In related work, Efing (2012) highlights that agen-
cies may bias their ratings upwards even with access to free and full credit
information, because they can share with the issuers the incremental revenues from
selling rating-inflated debt to regulated banks seeking more leverage. The normative
conclusion is that rating-contingent bank regulation might be very negative from a
welfare perspective.3
Reputational capital is often seen to attenuate these agency problems (Cantor and
Packer, 1995; Covitz and Harrison, 2003). Rating agencies have a long-term incentive
to invest in their reputation for producing high-quality ratings that are unbiased assess-
ments of creditworthiness. Yet a recent body of theoretical literature argues that the
quality of credit ratings based on reputational concerns is likely to change over the
business cycle as ratings’ quality decreases during booms and increases during troughs
(Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013). During periods of economic expansion, when fewer
defaults occur, rating agencies’ potential returns on reputational capital would be
lower. Moreover, during these episodes it is more difficult for final investors to ascer-
3 For Efing (2012), this is the case when agencies can share with issuers the incremental revenues from
selling rating-inflated debt to regulated banks that seek to arbitrage capital requirements.
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tain rating quality. The presence of ‘na€ıve investors’ would also strengthen the counter-
cyclical nature of ratings quality (Bolton et al., 2012).4 Evidence of rapid and wide-
spread downgrades of structured finance securities’ ratings over 2007–2008 is
consistent with the hypothesis of counter-cyclical ratings quality (Benmelech and Dlu-
gosz, 2009). Expansionary periods indeed coincide with higher revenues for rating
agencies, but it is unclear whether this is due to cyclicality in the volume of rating busi-
ness or cyclical rent extraction. Existing evidence suggests that credit ratings are a par-
ticularly good indicator of credit risk during crisis periods (Hilscher and Wilson, 2011).
Competition among rating agencies could also affect ratings quality through differ-
ent channels with contrary predictions. Higher competition among rating agencies
would reduce the benefit of good reputation leading to lower rating quality (Camanho
et al., 2010). Similarly, rating quality can be reduced if issuers shop for more favour-
able ratings (Bolton et al., 2012). Becker and Milbourn (2011) assert that the entry of
the rating agency Fitch in 1997 led to deterioration in ratings’ quality. On the other
hand, the industrial organization literature generally sees a positive role of competi-
tion for product quality – a finding that should also transfer to the market for credit
ratings (H€orner, 2002).
Rating quality in the banking sector might also be affected by reasons unrelated to
incentive problems. In particular, opacity and complexity might impair rating quality.
Compared with other large corporations, big banks are opaque in terms of their legal
structure, risk exposures and value creation process. Such opacity makes it harder to
predict financial distress for banks than for non-bank institutions. Rating disagree-
ments between agencies occur more often in the case of banks’ ratings than those of
other industries (Morgan, 2002). Structural changes in the banking sector have
increased opacity in recent decades – thus rendering the assessment of bank credit-
worthiness even more complicated. Financial innovation has increased complexity in
banking; more direct funding from financial markets and securitization activity has
formed part of a wider trend of innovation that has intensified credit risk transfer
between intermediaries (Boot and Thakor, 2010). Costly observability of creditworthi-
ness reduces the ability of market participants to screen noisy ratings and increases the
cost to a rating agency of issuing informative forecasts (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2011).
Generally, rating agencies might find it more profitable simply to issue lower-quality
ratings rather than to confront increasing bank complexity (Mathis et al., 2009; Skreta
and Veldkamp, 2009; Opp et al., 2013).
If asset complexity is an important determinant of rating quality, then a bank’s asset
choice and business model should explain rating accuracy. A number of studies have
focused on the impact of bank business models on bank risk and performance during
the recent crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2012), for example, found that banks with more
4 In other words ‘ratings are more likely to be inflated when there is a larger fraction of na€ıve investors in
the market who take ratings at face value’ (Bolton et al., 2012). Note that this does not mean that asset
managers (i.e. the agents of the ultimate investors) are na€ıve (Calomiris, 2009).
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Tier I capital and a higher ratio of loan to total assets performed better in the initial
stages of the crisis. Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that during banking crises
higher capital levels improve banks’ performance, while a larger deposit base and
more liquid assets are associated with higher returns. Cole and White (2012) show that
higher levels of capital and stronger CAMEL ratings lower the likelihood of bank
failure. Altunbas et al. (2011) find that banks with higher risk are larger and have less
capital, greater reliance on short-term market funding and aggressive credit growth.
In light of this research, we hypothesize that a bank’s business model is related to the
accuracy of its credit rating.
4. DATA
We construct a comprehensive panel of US and EU15 banks’ ratings from January
1990 to December 2011 based on rating data from Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s
and Fitch. The ratings datasets record whenever a rating is changed, affirmed or with-
drawn. We extract a time series by recording for each bank the most recent rating
observation at the end of each quarter. Our benchmark analysis concerns banks’
long-term issuer ratings, which refer to the probability of repayment of senior unse-
cured credit obligations. In an extended analysis, we also scrutinize bank financial
strength ratings, which assess banks’ creditworthiness as independent stand-alone
entities, absent reliance on government guarantees.
To focus on group-wide financial distress and avoid double-counting ratings within
a single institution, we discard any bank that is junior in the organizational structure –
for example, HSBC Holdings plc is retained as the bank holding company; junior
entities within this group, such as HSBC France SA, are discarded. More practically,
EDFs are mostly available at the level of the listed entity, which generally corresponds
to the bank holding company or most senior banking entity within a group, rather
than individual subsidiaries.
Ratings by the three rating agencies are translated into a numerical value from 1 to
24 according to Table 1, where the lowest rank number corresponds to the highest
credit ranking. Summary statistics for the quarterly ratings data are provided in
Table 2. We obtain an unbalanced panel with 38,753 quarterly bank ratings. Ratings
are assigned to 369 banks, which are each rated by between one and three agencies.
Standard and Poor’s provides the most complete coverage with 16,928 bank ratings
at quarterly frequency, followed by Moody’s (2,715) and Fitch (9,110). Rating cover-
age was relatively incomplete in the early 1990s, before widespread adoption of
the Basel recommendations: 75% of all panel observations concern the period after
January 2000.
The rating data are matched with annual accounting data from Bankscope. The
matching process employs bank identifiers, a text-string matching algorithm (Winkler,
2006) and manual work. Most accounting data are available only after 1994 and fea-
ture varying degrees of reporting coverage. To account for data errors, we undertake
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some winsorizing of extreme observations on balance-sheet variables. For example,
we impose that observations on leverage must lie between 0 and 1. Table 2 provides
the definitions of the accounting variables we retain and their summary statistics.
Finally, we match the above panel with data on EDFs as a measure of bank distress.
EDFs are obtained from a structural model of corporate default and widely used to
price corporate bond debt (Merton, 1974; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995).5 The main
model inputs are the volatility of asset returns (which aims to capture business risk)
and the difference between the market value of a bank’s assets and the book value of
its liabilities (accounting for leverage). Increases in volatility or leverage translate into
higher EDF levels. Our analysis draws on EDFs calculated by a division of the rating
agency Moody’s, contemporaneously to the rating process. Moody’s calculations are
undertaken monthly and draw on a large proprietary default database (Dwyer and
Qu, 2007). It is possible to reconstruct proxy EDFs using only public data (Bloechlin-
ger et al., 2012). But drawing on existing EDF data has the advantage that we do not
need to make any parameter or calibration choices. Our measurement of rating errors
is thus immune to any model selection or back-fitting criticism.
It is impossible to find the ideal indicator of bank risk. The EDF measure (as
calculated by Moody’s KMV) has a number of limitations. First, EDFs refer to the
probability of default on all credit obligations, regardless of seniority. In contrast,
long-term issuer ratings refer to the probability of repayment of senior unsecured
credit obligations. We abstract from this problem by noting that senior unsecured
credit is the most common type of credit in banks’ liability structures. Second, EDFs
incorporate expectations of creditor bail-out only indirectly due to the junior status of
equity in banks’ liability structures. Third, more elaborate structural models of credit
risk have been shown to provide a better out of sample prediction of bank risk
(Bharath and Shumway, 2008).6
Notwithstanding its limitations, our choice of the EDF indicator is justified by
specific reasons linked to our research design. First, EDFs attempt to measure the
probability of default on obligations to creditors, and are therefore comparable
with ratings.7 Unlike other indicators of bank risk (such as spreads on credit default
5 More specifically the calculation of EDF builds on Vasicek and Kealhofer’s extension of the Black–
Scholes–Merton option-pricing framework to make it suitable for practical analysis.
6 For our purpose, our main assumption would be that its functional form is useful for forecasting defaults
due to the relative nature of our variable and the short-term forecasting horizon for the EDF variable. We
therefore do not assume that the Merton distance to default model used by KMV produces an optimal
and sufficient statistic for the probability of default.
7 Both S&P and Fitch assign credit ratings based solely on the probability of default on obligations to
creditors. However, Moody’s credit assessment criteria are more complex: credit ratings represent ‘ordinal
measures of expected loss’ (Moody’s, 2006), where expected loss can be interpreted as the product of the
probability of default and loss given default. Elsewhere, Moody’s states that ‘ratings reflect both the likeli-
hood of default and any financial loss suffered in the event of default’. In this paper, we abstract from
Moody’s conflation of probability of default and loss given default, and treat Moody’s issuer ratings as
equivalent to S&P and Fitch ratings. Nevertheless, any structural between-group variation in the ratings
process would be captured by a Moody’s rating dummy, which is reported in most regressions.
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swaps), EDFs are available with a relatively long time series, facilitating more
robust panel analysis. Comparability between ratings and EDFs is further facilitated
by the continuous nature of the EDF variable, which allows bank risk to vary
within a rating category. Other structural measures of credit risk, such as Credit-
Metrics (created by JP Morgan), assume that issuers are homogeneous within the
same rating class.
Second, EDFs represent a good approximation of default risk perceived by equity
investors over a one-year horizon (Crouhy et al., 2000). Even though defaults have
occurred very suddenly over the recent financial crisis, EDF measures have predictive
power in an ordinal sense: financial institutions that subsequently defaulted had high
EDF measures relative to those of their peers (Munves et al., 2010).
Third, perhaps most importantly, any residual noise in EDF observations is unlikely
to have any structure related to the hypotheses examined in this paper. In particular,
as a mechanical measure based on equity prices, EDF noise is unlikely to be correlated
with variables related to our ‘conflict of interest’ hypothesis. Only ratings, which
depend on human judgement, can plausibly have a structure consistent with the con-
flict of interest hypothesis.
5. METHODOLOGY
A very narrow definition of rating quality could focus on their ability to discrimi-
nate between banks that experience defaults and those that do not. But such an
approach is problematic because of a small-sample problem. Outright corporate
default is rare – especially for banks that typically benefit from (implicit) govern-
ment guarantees of senior debtholders’ claims. It is therefore more appropriate to
consider bank ratings as general assessments of a bank’s probability of future
financial distress, which we operationalise as the forward EDF. We therefore com-
pare the credit ratings to EDFs measured k months forward in time. The latter
approach moves the statistical problem away from predicting a very small default
tail and broadens the analysis.
A second important issue concerns the interpretation of credit ratings. We prefer to
interpret ratings as solely ordinal measures of default probabilities. Moreover, long-
term issuer ratings represent opinions on creditworthiness through the cycle, rather
than short-term fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions (Moody’s, 2006; Kiff et al.,
2013). Our own methodology accounts for this aspect by adopting a strictly ordinal
interpretation of credit ratings by assigning a rank order to all credit ratings.
We rank order the bank ratings of all three rating agencies in any given quarter.
Banks rated AAA by an agency are given the lowest rank, AA the next lowest, etc.
Rating agencies use between 21 and 24 distinct rating buckets (see Table 1), resulting
in some ties in our panel of 369 banks. In order to reduce the number of rating ties,
we further subdivide the credit rating rank by the rating outlook as a second sorting cri-
terion. Within a given credit rating category, banks with a positive outlook are given
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the lower rank; negative outlooks are given the higher rank.8 A third and final sorting
criterion is the watchlist. If more than one bank features the same credit rating and the
same outlook, the banks ‘on watch’ receive a higher (lower) credit rating rank if the
outlook is negative (positive).9 Specifically, outlooks indicate the credit rating agency’s
opinion regarding the likely direction of an issuer’s rating over the medium term;
watchlist indicates that a rating is under review for possible change in the short term.
For each rating, we define a measure of rating error called the Ordinal Rating Quality
Shortfall (ORQS). ORQS is the absolute difference between the rank of a bank’s i credit
rating by rating agency a among all bank ratings at time t and the corresponding rank
of that bank’s EDF 10 at time t + k, normalized by sample size. Formally, we define:
ORQSða; i; t; kÞ ¼ jEDF rankði; t þ kÞ  Credit Rating rankða; i; tÞj
N  1
ORQS is bounded between 0 and 1, where 0 represents a perfect rating and 1 the
maximum shortfall or error (see Table 2 and Figure 3b).11 The metric allows for sim-
ple interpretation of the rating error. If a particular ORQS is, for example, 0.2 and the
sample of all bank ratings at time t comprises 300 observations, this implies that the
Credit Rating (CR) rank differs from the EDF rank by 60 observations. In other
words, there are 60 bank ratings for which the CR rank was lower (higher) and the
later EDF rank higher (lower). We interpret positive error as rating optimism, whereas
negative error implies rating pessimism.
The interpretation of ORQS as an indicator of rating quality requires that the EDF
rank is an unbiased measure of banks’ relative credit risk. The noisier our EDF bench-
mark, the more problematic the interpretation of ORQS as an indicator of rating
quality, as opposed to measurement error reflected in the EDF. To increase the preci-
sion of the EDF rank as a useful benchmark for rating quality, we measure the EDF at
k periods ahead. Our benchmark regressions take k to be two years, but results are
robust to different values of k (see Table 7). Taking forward EDF observations incorp-
orates additional equity price information. By construction, this forward observation
makes the EDF rank more informative about relative bank risk at time t + k than the
8 For example, consider five banks: banks A and B are rated AAA stable outlook; bank C is AAA negative
outlook; bank D is AAA negative outlook and on watch; bank E is AA+ positive outlook. Here, we would
assign rankings of 1.5 to bank A; 1.5 to bank B; 3 to bank C; 4 to bank D; 5 to bank E. Each rank is then
normalized by the sample size: in this case, 5.
9 Outlook and watchlist are used by credit rating agencies as ‘auxiliary signals about credit risk’. For more
details see ‘Moody’s Rating Symbols & Definitions’, Moody’s Investors Services, June 2009.
10 We also implement a subordinate second sort criterion for the purposes of calculating the final EDF
rank, in a similar manner to the ranking procedure used for ratings. Specifically, if more than one bank
has the same EDF, we implement a second sort criterion on the estimated distance-to-default. See Section
6 for further explanation of Moody’s KMV methodology.
11 For a set of axioms similar to those of Kemeny and Snell (1962), the ORQS defines a distance metric
for a pair of rankings. Compared to Cook et al. (1986), our distance measure does not consider partial
rankings (pairs without ranking information) and normalize the minimum distance (Axiom 7) to 1/N
instead of 1.
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credit rating rank observed at time t. While we concede that the ORQS picks up some
residual measurement error related to shortcomings of the EDF as structural measure
of default risk, it is not plausible that such measurement error correlates with the vari-
ables used for testing our hypotheses. Valid inference on the structure credit rating
errors only requires that the EDF measurement error is small and not correlated with
our explanatory variables.
A further critique of the ORQS concerns the conceptual difference between an EDF
and a credit rating. While the EDF provides a strictly probabilistic assessment of the
default event, a credit rating might in addition account for the magnitude of creditor
loss in the event of default. However, this conceptual difference should be of limited
relevance for our analysis. The small number of actual bank defaults makes it difficult
to incorporate precise information on expected credit loss into bank ratings. Both
EDFs and credit ratings are essentially probabilistic assessments of future default.
Figure 2 provides two scatter plots where the EDF rank (scaled by 1/N) on the y-axis
is plotted against the credit rating rank (also scaled by 1/N) on the x-axis. The scatter
plot focuses on the case where k = 24 months. The left-hand graph depicts observa-
tions where the EDF is measured outside the financial crisis and the right-hand graph
shows ratings for which the EDF (24 months later) falls within the financial crisis. The
dashed and solid lines represent kernel estimations of the mean and median of the
scaled EDF rank, respectively. Full information in credit ratings would imply that
the observations cluster along the 45 degree line. In this case the ranking of credit rat-
ings would perfectly correspond to the ranking of EDFs 24 months later. The scatter
plots show instead a more uniform dispersion of the observations over the entire quad-
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
S
ca
le
d 
E
D
F 
R
an
k 
(0
 =
 L
ow
es
t D
ef
au
lt 
P
ro
b.
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Scaled Rating Rank (0 = Highest Rating)
Non-Crisis Period
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
S
ca
le
d 
E
D
F 
R
an
k 
(0
 =
 L
ow
es
t D
ef
au
lt 
P
ro
b.
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Scaled Rating Rank (0 = Highest Rating)
Crisis Period
Mean by Kernel estimator Median by Kernel estimator 45-degree line
Figure 2. Rating quality in crisis versus non-crisis times
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rant, indicating low correlation between the credit rating and EDF ranks. For the
non-crisis period (depicted in the left graph), the mean and median of the scaled EDF
rank are approximately 0.5 for all of the 75% best rated banks (AAA to A–). Only for the
crisis period (depicted in the right-hand graph) do we observe a small positive relation-
ship between rating rank of the 75% best rated banks and the subsequent EDF rank.
Table 3 reports the Spearman (rank) correlation between both variables at different
horizons for the EDF measurement (k = {0, 12, 24, 36} months) for the full sample
(Panel A), the pre-crisis (Panel B) and crisis (Panel C) periods. The Spearman correla-
tion coefficient in the full sample moderately decreases from 0.283 to 0.176 as the
horizon increases from k = 0 to k = 36 months. At 0.352, the Spearman correlation
coefficient at k = 24 is much larger in the bottom third of credit ratings than in the
two other sample tiers. By contrast, the top tier and middle tier ratings provide no
evidence for a statistically positive correlation between EDF and CR rank. As these
two upper tiers correspond to investment grade rating, these tiers contain no information
regarding future expected default frequencies. Such evidence is difficult to reconcile
with current bank regulation, which stipulates large differences in risk weights
between a 20% weight for grades AAA to AA– and a much larger 50% risk weight for
credit risk in the A+ to A– range.
For EDFs calculated during the financial crisis this is visibly different as the positive
correlation between EDF rank and credit rating rank extends to banks with a top tier
rating (Figure 2, right-hand graph). The overall Spearman correlation for the crisis
period rises to 0.321 for k = 24 compared to only 0.178 outside the crisis. Credit rat-
Table 3. Rating quality and rank correlation
Panel A: Full sample
Spearman correlation between Subsamples
Full samplerating rank and EDF rank Top tier Middle tier Bottom tier
k = 0 0.034*** 0.022** 0.418*** 0.281***
k = 12 0.004 0.015 0.381*** 0.236***
k = 24 0.008 0.032*** 0.357*** 0.203***
k = 36 0.016 0.029** 0.342*** 0.175***
Panel B: Non-crisis period
k = 0 0.025** 0.003 0.402*** 0.257***
k = 12 0.027** 0.036*** 0.371*** 0.205***
k = 24 0.039*** 0.049*** 0.380*** 0.177***
k = 36 0.044*** 0.034** 0.382*** 0.164***
Panel C: crisis period
k = 0 0.082*** 0.134*** 0.508*** 0.399***
k = 12 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.446*** 0.382***
k = 24 0.131*** 0.061 0.277*** 0.319***
k = 36 0.121*** 0.039 0.158*** 0.230***
Note: Parameter k denotes the time lag (in months) for the EDF measurement. The symbols *, **, and *** repres-
ent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Top tier ratings comprise (mostly) ratings from AAA to
AA, middle tier ratings those from A+ to A, and bottom tier ratings those from BBB+ to C. The tiers are con-
structed by dividing the sample into three.
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ings are therefore considerably more informative for banks’ relative creditworthiness
within a financial crisis than outside.
An important part of our analysis consists of explaining the determinants of rating
errors, where ORQS becomes the dependent variable in a linear regression analysis.
Its distribution is strongly positively skewed, as shown in Figure 3b. We therefore
apply a Box–Cox transformation to ORQS and thereby create a rank-preserving new
variable named Transformed Ordinal Rating Quality Shortfall (TORQS), which is more suit-
able for regression analysis. The Box–Cox parameter of –0.224 brings the skewness
exactly to zero (Figure 3c).12 The new TORQS features reduced kurtosis of 1.95
(relative to 2.55 for ORQS) and serves as the dependent variable for rating accuracy in
all subsequent analysis. Its panel structure also allows us to explore the determinants
of rating quality in the cross-section (across banks and rating agencies) in a linear
framework:
ORQSða; i; t; kÞ ¼ Xða; i; tÞ  bðkÞ þ 
where the explanatory variables
Xða; i; tÞ ¼ ½BCði; tÞ;DðaÞ;RV ða; i; tÞ;DðtÞ;DðiÞ
include bank characteristics BC(i,t), rating agency dummies or country dummies
D(a), bank-rating agency relationship variables RV(a,i,t), time/crisis fixed effects
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Figure 3. Distributions of ratings and measures of ratings quality
12 A Box–Cox parameter of –1 corresponds to the log transformation. The latter scales down large ratings
errors more strongly and is more discriminating for small rating errors.
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D(t) and country-fixed effects D(i). We can thus test a variety of economically interest-
ing hypotheses regarding the determinants of ratings quality. These are elaborated in
the next section.
The ORQS (and its transformation TORQS) treat positive and negative errors sym-
metrically. But some of our hypotheses relate to rating bias rather than error. The
distinction between error and bias is elaborated in Calomiris (2009). Rating error arises
from ‘innocent’ but ‘flawed measures of underlying risk’ (Calomiris, 2009), and is a
function of the degree of complexity of the rated entity and the extent of the rating
agency’s investment in credit analysis. In contrast, rating bias generally refers to delib-
erate systematic over-rating, which might occur due to conflicts of interest arising
from the issuer-pays model (Partnoy, 2006). As a proxy for rating bias, we capture a
positive directional effect in the rating error by defining the Directional Ordinal Rating
Quality Shortfall (DORQS) as:
DORQSða; i; t; kÞ ¼ EDF rankði; t;þ kÞ  Credit Rating rankða; i; tÞ
N  1
The DORQS measure is sufficiently close to a normal distribution (Figure 3d),
enabling us to apply regression analysis directly without any further variable transfor-
mation. We also highlight that DORQS has by construction a near-zero cross-sectional
mean (Table 2) and therefore does not detect any overall rating bias for all banks.
Our analysis of bank rating bias is confined to rating distortion within the bank sam-
ple.
6. HYPOTHESES ABOUT CREDIT RATING QUALITY
In this section we formulate and discuss four hypotheses about the determinants of
rating quality. As suggested by Figure 2, the generally low information content of rela-
tive ratings for future relative expected default frequency (EDF) does not preclude that
the rating error has a systematic structure, which should be explored separately.
H1: Ratings quality during the crisis and after credit booms
Ordinal ratings quality shortfall depends on the state of the financial system and the credit
cycle. Bank credit ratings are more informative (in an ordinal sense) about bank distress when
distress occurs during periods of financial crisis.
The Lehman bankruptcy and other prominent ratings failures have conveyed the
misleading impression that bank ratings become more inaccurate during a financial
crisis. However, this is at odds with the summary statistics presented in the previous
section. The Spearman rank correlation between EDF rank and the CR rank dramat-
ically increases as the bank system entered the crisis. This suggests that ORQS has a
cyclical component, particularly for the majority of banks rated A– or better.
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Expansionary credit cycles may also affect rating accuracy as they foreshadow later
bank distress (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013).
For the empirical part, we define a global financial crisis dummy. The dummy takes
on the value of 1 when the mean EDF is greater than 2%. In our sample of banks, this
occurs from 2008Q3 to 2010Q4, and again in 2011Q2 and 2011Q3. Importantly,
our crisis dummy is contemporaneous with the observation on the EDF variable. For
example, when ORQS is defined using a two-year gap between the credit rating and
the EDF, the crisis dummy will equal 1 when the credit rating is measured two years
prior to crisis (i.e., 2006Q3–2008Q4 and 2009Q2–2009Q3). As a measure of the
credit cycle, we use private credit growth over the previous three years at country
level. This second measure adds cross-sectional variation (across the 16 countries in
our panel) unlike the crisis dummy, which features only time variation.
H2: Rating quality across rating agencies and countries
Ordinal ratings quality shortfall varies across rating agencies.
First, rating agencies may differ in their rating methodology and in the quality of
their credit analysts. Differences between the ability of equity analysts have been
documented by Bradshaw (2011) and Fang and Yasuda (2009). Second, rating agen-
cies may also differ in their access to non-public bank information. Unfortunately, the
incidence of unsolicited bank ratings is low, precluding exploration of the latter aspect
in more detail. Third, agency and incentive problems may also differ across rating
agencies and manifest themselves in certain rating biases. To explore cross-agency dif-
ferences in rating accuracy and rating bias, we define dummy variables called Moody’s
and S&P which capture the average agency-specific rating shortfall relative to Fitch
ratings.
H3: Rating quality and conflicts of interest
Rating agencies provide better bank ratings to banks that are (i) larger and (ii) generate more
securitization business.
Large banks typically have many rated subsidiary entities, so that a large bank is in
a much stronger client position. Bank size may therefore augment conflicts of interest
for the rating agency. Moreover, asset securitization provides a substantial income
stream to both banks (as the asset originators) and to the rating agencies and may gen-
erate additional conflicts of interest. To explore these in more detail, we use the Dea-
logic database to identify 1,189 unique issuers of asset-backed securities with a total
face value of US$6 trillion over 1990–2012. The securities comprise residential mort-
gage-backed securities (which make up 28% of the sample), other asset-backed securi-
ties (3.8%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (3.4%), collateralized loan
obligations (5%), other collateralized debt obligations (5.9%) and home equity loans
(53.8%). Importantly, we observe which of the three major rating agencies provided
ratings when the security was issued. The supply of asset-backed securities concen-
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trated among 200 issuers that account for 90% of the total market. We combine these
200 largest issuers with the 369 banks in our sample, obtaining 53 successful matches
(which together account for 35% of the total market for asset-backed securities). The
remaining 147 issuers are mostly non-bank issuers, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Any bank outside the list of 200 top issuers is assumed not to issue any asset-
backed securities. Even for the 53 most active banks, securitization business is highly
irregular over time, so that aggregation over the entire time period provides the best
measurement of the overall securitization business shared between a bank and a rating
agency. As our proxy for conflicts of interest in bank ratings, we define a bank’s agency-
specific securitization business (ASSB) as
ASSBða; iÞ ¼ log½1þ assets securitized by bank i and rated by ageny a
The log transformation is appropriate because a large share of the securitization
business is concentrated among a relatively small number of banks, with the 10 largest
banks accounting for roughly 65.7% of the asset origination of the 53 banks in our
sample.
H4: Ratings quality and bank characteristics
Ordinal ratings quality shortfall depends on key bank characteristics including size, capital
structure, asset structure and funding structures.
The regulatory debate makes explicit reference to most of these bank character-
istics. Large banks might be subject to more stringent regulation because of their sys-
temic importance, while other regulatory proposals want to separate banks with
trading income from those doing loan business only (Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 2010; Independent Commission on Banking, 2011).
Yet little is known about how these bank characteristics relate to the quality of bank
ratings. For example, if large banks exhibit greater rating errors or benefit more from
rating inflation, this provides an additional argument in favour of size-contingent bank
regulation for bank capital (BCBS, 2011). Moreover, such findings would suggest that
regulation of large (and systematically important) banks should be less reliant on
rating agencies’ assessments of creditworthiness.
We measure bank size by Log assets (natural log of the book value of assets). Large
banks may generally be more complex and thus more difficult to rate, increasing both
positive and negative rating errors. On the other hand, size often comes with revenue
diversification and hence more stability, which suggests an offsetting effect on rating
accuracy. However, unlike the conflict of interest mechanism, rating complexity and
asset diversification should change the error variance, without creating a bias.
Capital structure is captured by Leverage, defined as total assets divided by book
equity all divided by 100. Bank leverage has often been deemed excessive and condu-
cive to more risk (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), hence our interest in whether it also
contributes to larger rating errors. Asset structure is proxied by two variables, namely
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the Loan share (total loans over total assets) and Trading share (net profit on trading and
derivatives divided by total assets). Here we explore the impact of both business mod-
els on the accuracy of bank credit ratings. Funding structure is represented as Short-
term funding share, measured as deposit and short-term funding divided by total assets.
An extensive literature concerns the nexus between competition and rating quality.
Competition may foster reputational effects, which appear to matter for the reporting
quality of equity analysts (Fang and Yasuda, 2009). Others have argued that competi-
tion may also compromise rating quality if corporations can ‘shop’ for the best avail-
able rating (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). To control for variation in the level of
competition over time, we measure market share of the three largest rating agencies
using the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index of concentration (HH index). Market con-
centration decreased over the 1990s due to an increase in market share of Fitch.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on any of the smaller rating agencies; their mar-
ket share is ignored, which implies some measurement error for the HH index. A sec-
ond control variable considers the rating conditions at the bank level. Roughly 73%
of all banks have multiple ratings, which should reduce the absolute importance of
any single rating of this bank. We create a Multiple rating dummy, which takes on the
value of 1 whenever more than one rating agency has issued a bank rating (and 0
otherwise). Banks have some control over how many ratings they sequentially solicit.
Thus banks with only one rating are most likely to enjoy a more favourable one.
7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
7.1. Rating quality during the crisis and after credit booms
The distributional evidence in Figure 2, and the corresponding Spearman correla-
tions in Panel B of Table 3, suggests that in normal times (when the EDF is observed
outside of financial crisis) bank credit ratings contain information about future default
risk only for speculative investment grades. For all investment grade ratings (corres-
ponding approximately to a rating rank below the 66% percentile), the mean and
median EDF rank do not vary substantially with the credit rating rank. The Spearman
correlation between both variables is even slightly negative. This pattern changes if
we restrict the sample to EDFs observed during the financial crisis. Here, we find a
positive Spearman correlation over the entire rating scale, with an overall rank cor-
relation of 0.321 at the two-year horizon (k =24).
Columns (1)–(3) in Table 4 confirm this finding in panel regressions with TORQS as
the dependent variable. We use a Crisis dummy to mark all ratings for which the EDF
is reported at a moment of high global bank distress, namely for the quarters 2008Q4
–2010Q4 and again 2011Q2–2011Q3. The coefficient estimate of –0.031 in column
(1) implies that financial crisis reduced TORQS by 7.4% relative to its unconditional
standard deviation of 0.4205. Column (2) adds Credit growth over a three-year period
prior to the rating as additional controls for credit booms. At the end of a credit boom
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and in a financial crisis, the ordinal rating error decreases significantly. Hence ratings
quality is counter-cyclical: bank ratings are a better predictor of credit risk during a
financial crisis than in normal times. This finding contradicts the frequently voiced
criticism that bank ratings are less reliable during financial crises.
The specification in Table 4, columns (1) and (2), uses country fixed effects, while
column (3) reports coefficient estimates using bank fixed effects. Coefficients show little
variation across these specifications. Given that ratings are measured at quarterly fre-
quency, we expected considerable serial correlation in the error structure. The estim-
ated serial correlation is indeed high at around 0.77. The reported standard errors are
adjusted for this serial correlation.
We repeat these regressions with DORQS as the dependent variable in Table 4, col-
umns (4)–(6). By construction, the DORQS as the difference between two rankings has
a zero mean so that any time fixed effect or crisis dummy should also be zero (except
for mission observations in the regression). Surprisingly, stronger past credit growth
does not generate any statistically significant positive rating error bias for the DORQS
beyond what is captured in country or bank fixed effects.
7.2. Rating quality across countries and rating agencies
Rating agencies may differ in their rating technology and the degree to which they
have conflicts of interest with respect to revenue sources. As our data cover the three
largest rating agencies, it is interesting to explore agency-specific differences in the
accuracy of ratings. Here we also report and control for country fixed effects, as cross-
Table 4. Credit ratings during crisis and after credit booms
Dependent variable
Non-directional error: TORQS Directional error: DORQS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis dummy 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit growth 0.210*** 0.200 *** 0.033 0.032
(0.040) (0.040) (0.024) (0.024)
Av serial correlation 0.777 0.768 0.768 0.777 0.768 0.768
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Bank fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Time fixed effects No No No No No No
No. of observations 21,131 18,218 18,218 21,131 18,218 18,218
Note: Reported are panel regressions with bank level random effects. The regression allows for serial AR(1) cor-
relation of the error. The panel regressions allow for an AR(1) serial correlation structure and random effects.
Symbols represent: Crisis = dummy for a crisis 8 quarters forward, with crisis defined as the period from
2008Q4:2010Q4 and 2011Q2:2011Q3; Credit growth = change in country-level private credit stock on 12
quarters previous. Coefficients for country and bank fixed effects are not reported. The symbols *, **, and ***
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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country differences in accounting standards and regulatory supervision may also
co-determine the rating precision.
Table 5 reports panel regressions with agency, country and time fixed effects; col-
umns (1)–(3) focus on the non-directional rating error measured by TORQS, whereas
columns (4)–(6) feature the directional error or rating bias DORQS as the dependent
variable. The baseline specification in columns (1) and (4) controls for bank size meas-
ured by Log assets and reports all country fixed effects. The regression specification
allows for serial correlation of the regression error and reports the adjusted standard
errors.13 Bank size correlates strongly with both the non-directional and directional
measure of rating error – a robust data feature discussed in more detail in the next
section.
The country fixed effect in column (1) shows that banks headquartered in Aus-
tria, Ireland and the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent France and Portu-
gal, feature significantly higher ratings errors. The results are more apparent in
column (4) for the directional error: the coefficient on every EU country dummy
is positive, suggesting that European banks enjoy strong positive rating bias rela-
tive to the ratings of US-based banks. This result is robust when the regression is
run on the subsample of Moody’s and S&P ratings, thus contradicting the asser-
tion that these US-based rating agencies might have been prejudiced against non-
US banks.
Columns (2) and (5) introduce additional agency dummies for ratings issued by
Moody’s and S&P. Controlling for bank size, and time and country fixed effects, S&P
ratings are significantly more negative than those of Moody’s and Fitch. This implies
that rating errors feature a systematic component that is related to an agency’s broad
rating policy.
The analysis in the following sections retains agency and country dummies as con-
trol variables. However, the country dummies are not reported separately as they are
very similar to those provided in Table 5, columns (1) and (4), respectively.
7.3. Rating quality and bank size
A key regulatory concern relates to possible upward bias in ratings arising from conflicts
of interest between a rating agency and a bank. A bank’s power in relation to a rating
agency is related to its size. Larger banks are more likely to have multiple and more
comprehensive business relations with rating agencies. Often national bank subsidiaries
might require additional ratings beyond the rating for the holding company.
Regressions reported in Table 5, columns (2) and (5), confirm the important role of
bank size as a determinant of rating accuracy and bias. Bank size measured as Log
13 The reported standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation of the errors using the xtregar command
in Stata. Quantitatively very similar results are obtained if we correct the standard errors for clustering at
the bank level.
314 HARALD HAU, SAM LANGFIELD AND DAVID MARQUES-IBANEZ
T
a
b
le
5
.
R
a
ti
n
g
q
u
a
li
ty
b
y
b
a
n
k
s
iz
e
,
a
g
e
n
c
y
-s
p
e
c
if
ic
s
e
c
u
r
it
iz
a
ti
o
n
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
a
n
d
r
a
ti
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
y
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
N
o
n
-d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
a
l
er
ro
r:
T
O
R
Q
S
D
ir
ec
ti
o
n
a
l
er
ro
r:
D
O
R
Q
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
S
iz
e L
o
g
a
ss
et
s
0
.0
1
3
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
)
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
7
)
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
7
)
0
.0
5
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
0
.0
4
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
)
0
.0
4
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
)
S
ec
u
ri
ti
za
ti
o
n
A
S
S
B
0
.0
0
2
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
A
S
S
B
ex
g
u
a
ra
n
te
e
0
.0
0
2
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
A
g
en
cy
d
u
m
m
ie
s
M
o
o
d
y’
s
0
.0
1
7
(0
.0
2
6
)
0
.0
1
7
(0
.0
2
6
)
0
.0
4
6
*
(0
.0
2
5
)
0
.0
4
6
*
(0
.0
2
5
)
S
&
P
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
2
5
)
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
2
5
)
0
.0
8
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
4
)
0
.0
8
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
4
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s:
A
u
st
ri
a
0
.2
1
8
*
*
(0
.0
9
1
)
0
.3
4
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
8
)
B
el
g
iu
m
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
9
0
)
0
.1
9
9
*
*
(0
.0
8
7
)
C
yp
ru
s
0
.3
1
9
*
(0
.1
7
8
)
0
.2
8
2
(0
.1
7
2
)
D
en
m
a
rk
0
.0
7
3
(0
.0
8
9
)
0
.2
5
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
7
)
F
in
la
n
d
0
.0
0
2
(0
.1
2
1
)
0
.3
6
7
*
*
*
(0
.1
1
9
)
F
ra
n
ce
0
.1
0
4
*
*
(0
.0
5
1
)
0
.3
3
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
1
)
G
er
m
a
n
y
0
.0
1
6
(0
.0
4
5
)
0
.2
3
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
3
)
G
re
ec
e
0
.1
0
1
*
(0
.0
5
8
)
0
.1
3
8
*
*
(0
.0
5
6
)
Ir
el
a
n
d
0
.2
4
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
6
)
0
.2
4
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
4
)
It
a
ly
0
.0
0
9
(0
.0
3
4
)
0
.0
4
0
(0
.0
3
4
)
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
0
.1
9
9
(0
.1
5
9
)
0
.1
3
2
(0
.1
6
0
)
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
0
.1
4
4
*
(0
.0
7
8
)
0
.1
5
9
*
*
(0
.0
7
7
)
S
p
a
in
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
4
6
)
0
.1
3
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
5
)
S
w
ed
en
0
.1
0
9
(0
.0
6
7
)
0
.1
9
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
8
)
U
n
it
ed
K
in
g
d
o
m
0
.1
7
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
2
)
0
.2
6
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
0
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
e
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
.
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
7
,2
2
6
1
7
,2
2
6
1
7
,2
2
6
1
7
,2
2
6
1
7
,2
2
6
1
7
,2
2
6
N
ot
e:
R
ep
o
rt
ed
a
re
p
a
n
el
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
w
it
h
b
a
n
k
le
ve
l
ra
n
d
o
m
ef
fe
ct
s.
T
h
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
a
ll
o
w
s
fo
r
se
ri
a
l
A
R
(1
)
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
er
ro
r.
S
ym
b
o
ls
re
p
re
se
n
t:
L
o
g
a
ss
et
s
=
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
a
b
a
n
k’
s
o
n
b
a
la
n
ce
-s
h
ee
t
a
ss
et
s
in
U
S
D
;
A
S
S
B
=
a
g
en
cy
sp
ec
if
ic
se
cu
ri
ti
za
ti
o
n
b
u
si
n
es
s
(b
u
si
n
es
s
vo
lu
m
e
b
et
w
ee
n
a
g
en
cy
a
n
d
b
a
n
k
m
ea
su
re
d
in
lo
g
s)
;
A
S
S
B
ex
-g
u
a
ra
n
te
e
=
sa
m
e
a
s
A
S
S
B
,
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
d
ea
ls
w
h
ic
h
a
re
g
u
a
ra
n
te
ed
ei
th
er
b
y
th
e
is
su
in
g
b
a
n
k
o
r
a
th
ir
d
p
a
rt
y;
M
o
o
d
y’
s
=
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
a
M
o
o
d
y’
s
ra
ti
n
g
;
S
&
P
=
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
a
n
S
&
P
ra
ti
n
g
.
C
o
ef
fi
-
ci
en
ts
fo
r
ti
m
e
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
a
re
n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
;
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
o
n
ly
in
co
lu
m
n
(1
),
a
lt
h
o
u
g
h
th
e
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
a
re
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
a
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
T
h
e
sy
m
b
o
ls
*,
**
,
a
n
d
**
*
re
p
re
se
n
t
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
ce
le
ve
ls
o
f
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
BANK RATINGS 315
assets strongly and positively correlates with both non-directional rating error (TORQS)
and rating bias (DORQS). The regression coefficient of 0.042 for Log assets in Table 5,
column (5), implies that a bank size increase by two standard deviations translates into
an inflated credit rating rank (relative to the EDF rank) by 15 positions for every 100
banks in the sample.14 This corresponds, for example, to an undeserved rating improve-
ment from A– to A. Based on yields to maturity on banks’ bonds and medium-term notes
issued to the primary market over 2002–12, a rating improvement from A– to A equates
to a considerable average reduction in funding costs of 40 basis points.
We highlight that conflicts of interest between rating agencies and large banks may
not be the only interpretation of the rating error and positive bias arising from bank
size. An alternative interpretation could relate this bias to the ‘too big to fail’ privilege
of big banks. Our analysis is based on ‘all-in’ ratings, which account for the ability of
banks’ home sovereign to bail out banks’. Cross-country differences in governments’
ability to bail out banks are captured by country fixed effects and should not affect
our results. However, the implicit government support for banks might protect credi-
tors of big banks more than those of small banks – something that the rating agency
might account for in its rating process. If the bank’s equity price and expected default
frequency insufficiently accounts for this ‘too big to fail’ distortion, then the positive
correlation between the DORQS and bank size can be predicted as the outcome of the
rating agency’s foresight rather than any conflict of interest. In this interpretation, the
rating process just reflects substantial competitive distortion, rather than creates it.
Section 8 probes this alternative explanation further by using so-called ‘financial
strength’ or ‘stand-alone’ ratings, which explicitly ignore sovereign support for banks.
The rank difference between stand-alone ratings and conventional ‘all-in’ issuer
ratings, which incorporate the conditional probability of government support,
captures the ‘too big to fail’ privilege of systemically important banks in the form of a
rating uplift. Including this control does not eliminate the considerable bias in favour
of large banks, which casts doubt on this alternative interpretation.
A third interpretation of bias in favour of large banks could be that rating agencies
collectively misjudged the relative fragility of large banks in a financial crisis. For
example, the crisis revealed enormous potential losses for large dealer banks related to
their over-the-counter product exposure (Duffie, 2010). The two-year-ahead measure-
ment of banks’ expected default frequency might introduce a hindsight bias which is
particularly pronounced for large banks. To eliminate this potential for hindsight bias,
Table 7 repeats the regression in Table 6 for the special case with k = 0 (instead of k =
24 months) so that the EDF and credit rating are observed contemporaneously. The
magnitude of the bank size coefficient drops by half, but remains highly significant. At
14 Two standard deviations in log assets are 3.58 (see Table 2) so that we obtain a predicted change of
0.15 (=3.58 90.042) for DORQS. In Table 1, the difference between the average rank for an A and an A–
rating is 0.162.
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best, delayed learning about riskiness resulting from bank size can therefore explain
about half of the rating bias in favour of large banks.
It is also important to highlight the strength of the rating error attributed to large
banks at the onset of the crisis in January 2007. Figure 4, panel A, divides all direc-
tional rating errors into quintiles and plots the mean and median bank size within
each quintile. The average bank size within each quintile increases almost tenfold,
from a mean asset value of US$74 billion for the 20% most underrated banks to US
$713 billion for the 20% most overrated banks. Similarly, median bank size jumps
from US$16 billion in assets to US$261 billion.
This pronounced bias in favour of large banks is apparent also if rating error is
measured not in terms of the future EDF rank, but simply by the change in the rating
rank over two years. Figure 4, panel D, reports the mean and median bank size for
quintiles of rating changes from the 20% largest upgrades to the 20% largest down-
grades between January 2007 and January 2009. The ratings which were most
inflated in January 2007 – that is, the ratings which were subsequently downgraded
the most over the crisis – concern disproportionately the largest banks. The 20% most
downgraded banks dominate other quintiles in terms of size, with mean (median)
assets of US$713 billion (US$262 billion) in January 2007. Independent of the defini-
tion of rating error, large banks enjoyed on average overoptimistic credit ratings
before the financial crisis.
7.4. Rating quality and securitization business
An important revenue source for rating agencies concerns ratings of asset-backed secur-
ities. The larger the bilateral business volume measured by a bank’s agency-specific securit-
ization business (ASSB), the more the quality of the bank rating might be compromised.
Unlike the bank size variable, the ASSB variable allows us to infer how different agencies
rated the same bank as a function of their specific business relationship in rating struc-
tured products. This permits clearer inference on conflicts of interest in bank ratings.
In Table 5, column (5), we find that the ASSB measure is related to a statistically
significant upward bias in the rating.15 Figure 5 captures this rating bias effect in a
scatter plot of the directional rating error DORQS against bank size for all sample banks
in January 2007. Grey and black circles distinguish banks with and without substantial
securitization business, respectively. The vertical lines between small and large black
circles depict the predicted marginal change in the directional error due to the bank’s
agency-specific securitization business. Figure 5 also illustrates that most of the banks
engaged in asset securitization are large. Rating favours related to agency-specific
securitization business therefore occur in addition to the general rating bias in favour
of large banks. Again, we can quantify the economic magnitude of the rating bias in
15 This effect is also robust to the inclusion of bank fixed effects.
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column (5). An increase in ASSB by two standard deviations (or 19.01) is associated
with a rating improvement of 10 ranks for every 100 banks in the sample. This mar-
ginal effect amounts to an economically substantial rating favour resulting from bilat-
eral business related to securitization.
A more benign interpretation for the significantly positive ASSB coefficient could
be a correlated rating error between the bank rating and the ratings in structured
products. Occasionally, an issuing bank provides credit enhancing guarantees so that
credit risk of the structured product becomes correlated with the bank credit rating.
An overoptimistic bank rating by any credit rating agency might thus jointly occur
with a more favourable rating for the bank’s structured products. In turn, this may
generate more rating business for the agency if the issuing bank chooses agencies
based on the best available rating. In order to control for this channel, we set to zero
all business volume where the security has a guarantor. Such guarantees concern
3.7% of all securitization deals in our sample. The new variable ASSB ex-guarantee
should be more robust to the reverse causality based on correlated errors between
bank and securitization ratings. Table 5, column (6) shows that this alternative ‘con-
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flict of interest proxy’ produces identical regression results. Explicit credit guarantees
for some of the securitization volume do not explain why more favourable bank
ratings correlate with agency-specific securitization business.
7.5. Rating quality and bank characteristics
Banks differ not only in size, but also in profitability, capital structure, asset structure
or business model and funding structure. How do these bank characteristics relate to
rating accuracy and rating bias? Are previous findings robust if we control for these
bank characteristics?
In the following extended regression analysis, it might not always be appropriate to
consider these variables as exogenous to the rating error. Reverse causality is particu-
larly plausible from the level of ratings to some bank characteristics such as profitability
or funding structure. For example, banks with low ratings may face higher financing
costs, seek shorter maturities on the liability side of their balance sheet or experience
lower profitability. However, the dependent variable in our analysis is not the rating
level, but rather TORQS or DORQS, which are less likely to have feedback effects on
corporate decisions. We also note that a larger, but symmetric and transitory, rating
error (like TORQS) should – to a first-order linear approximation – have no steady
state effect on corporate decisions since its expected long-run impact is always zero.
On the other hand, changes to the asset structure of a bank might involve consider-
able adjustment costs so that causal effect from the rating error (and particularly the
TORQS) on bank asset choices are less plausible.
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Table 6 extends the panel regressions in Table 5 by including additional bank
characteristics. In columns (1)–(2) and (3)–(4), we use both country and time fixed
effects. The reported standard errors are adjusted for the serial correlation at the
bank level. Bank profitability (RoA) and capital structure (Leverage) show no evi-
dence of any incremental correlation with either rating accuracy (TORQS) or rat-
ing bias (DORQS). By contrast, the asset structure is significantly related to rating
accuracy, but not to the rating bias. The negative coefficient on the Loan share
variable in columns (1)–(3) suggests that a traditional lending-based banking model
is associated with higher rating accuracy, but no directional rating bias. This sug-
gests that bank asset complexity or insufficient disclosure represent important
obstacles to rating quality.16
Surprisingly, a high Trading share also correlates (weakly) with higher rating
accuracy. This could be explained by the strong countercyclical nature of trading
revenues. The average correlation of bank trading revenue with the VIX index of
equity market volatility is relatively important at 0.18. Market-making and pro-
prietary trading appears to deliver revenue stabilizing income in times of financial
crisis when market volatility is high.17 Our finding of a significant negative coeffi-
cient on the Trading share variable in columns (1)–(3) implies that credit rating
agencies systematically underestimate the countercyclical effect of trading activity
on bank creditworthiness. The Short-term funding share variable correlates with a
smaller ratings bias in columns (4)–(6). This variable not only measures the degree
of maturity transformation, but also the size of the deposit base of a bank. This
means that banks with a large depositor base tend to be systematically underrated
relative to their future expected default frequencies.
Inclusion of these various bank characteristics does not change the coefficient
estimates from Table 5 for the bank size variable (Log assets) and the bank’s agency-
specific securitization business (ASSB). Even conditional on bank characteristics, bank
size and bank securitization activity with a rating agency remain highly correlated
with the rating bias.
7.6. Ratings quality and competition
Finally, we explore the role of competition in the market for bank ratings. After 2000,
competition in the rating market increased as Fitch became a more important com-
petitor through acquisitions of smaller rating agencies and a general expansion of its
rating business (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). Based on the number of bank ratings
generated by the three major rating agencies, we construct a Herfindahl–Hirschmann
16 One representative of a rating agency highlighted the frequent lack of disaggregate data on bank assets
as an important informational shortcoming which also extends to bank management.
17 For evidence of bank trading profitability with respect to exchange rate volatility, see for example Hau
(1998).
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index (HH index) of industry concentration, which shows decreasing industry concen-
tration after 2000. A separate Multiple rating dummy captures cross-sectional variation in
the number of ratings for individual banks.
Table 6. Rating quality and additional bank characteristics
Dependent
variable
Non-Directional error: TORQS Directional error: DORQS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size
Log assets 0.014* 0.007 0.013* 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.046***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Securitization
ASSB 0.003** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ASSB ex-guarantee
0.003** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Agency dummies
Moody’s 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.047* 0.047* 0.047*
(0.027) (0.027) 0.027 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
S&P 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089***
(0.025) (0.025) 0.025 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Profitability
RoA 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Capital structure
Leverage 0.009 0.018 0.009 0.019 0.005 0.019
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Asset structure
Loans share 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trading share 4.322* 5.261** 4.323* 0.506 0.218 0.528
(2.256) (2.255) (2.256) (1.299) (1.291) (1.299)
Funding structure
Short-term
funding share
0.012 0.039 0.012 0.072** 0.058* 0.072**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Rating Competition
Multiple rating
dummy
0.001 0.029***
(0.018) (0.011)
HH index 0.455 0.145
(0.420) (0.249)
Av. serial
correlation
0.762 0.763 0.761 0.859 0.859 0.859
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No No
No. of observations 15,426 15,426 15,426 15,426 15,426 15,426
Note: Reported are panel regressions with bank level random effects. The regression allows for serial AR(1) corre-
lation of the error. The independent variables are: Log assets = natural log of a bank’s on balance-sheet assets in
USD; ASSB = agency specific securitization business (business volume between agency and bank measured in
logs); ASSB ex-guarantee = same as ASSB, excluding deals which are guaranteed either by the issuing bank or a
third party; Agency dummies for Moody’s and S&P are 1 if the rating is from the respective agency and 0 other-
wise; RoA = return on average assets; Leverage = assets divided by equity all divided by 100;Loans share = total
loans divided by total assets; Trading share = net profits on trading and derivatives divided by total assets; Short
term funding share = deposits and short-term funding divided by total assets; Multiple rating dummy = dummy
taking the value 1 if a bank is rated by more than one agency, 0 otherwise; HH index =
Herfindahl–Hirschmann index for concentration in the market for bank ratings. Coefficients for country and
time fixed effects are not reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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In Table 6, columns (2) and (5), we report the panel regressions with both measures
of competition for TORQS and DORQS, respectively. Since the HH index represents a
pure time series, neither specification features time fixed effects. Unlike the HH index,
the Multiple rating dummy shows strong negative correlation with DORQS. The 73% of
banks ratings classified as multiple ratings were less favourable (by on average three
ranks for every 100 banks) than those for which only one rating was issued. If banks
acquire ratings sequentially, then they should have stronger incentives to solicit
additional ratings if the first rating is unfavourable. Such strategic ‘shopping for better
ratings’ predicts that the multiple rating dummy should be associated with less average
overrating. This prediction is borne out by the data. Importantly, inclusion of both
control variables in Table 6 does not change the qualitative evidence discussed in the
previous sections.
8. ROBUSTNESS
The analysis to this point was based on the two year lag (k = 8 quarters) between the
credit rating and the EDF measurement. Next we show that our results are robust to
other forecast horizons, for example one year or three years. Table 7 repeats the full
specification in Table 6, columns (2) and (5), for different measurement lags of k = 0,
4, 12 quarters. Interestingly, the coefficients for the rating bias related to bank size
and securitization business with the rating agency remain more or less stable for differ-
ent lags. This implies that our main findings – concerning the rating privilege of large
banks as well as the rating bias related to securitization business – are robust to the lag
between observations on the rating and EDF.
Somewhat less robust are the coefficients on variables characterizing the bank’s
asset structure. For example, at the three-year horizon (k = 12), the negative cor-
relation between Loan share and TORQS drops to a 10% significance level (column
3), whereas the bank’s Trading share is now negatively related to DORQS at the
1% level. Banks with a high trading income (relative to their assets) on average
deserved a better rating at this three-year horizon relative to what was in fact
assigned. The Multiple ratings dummy is still associated with lower bank ratings error
DORQS at the one-year horizon, but becomes statistically insignificant at the
three-year forecast horizon. The latter effect might be caused by the reduced
sample size at the longer horizon.
Finally, we explore whether the rating bias in favour of large banks may simply
reflect larger implicit government guarantees for the debt of ‘too big to fail’ banks.
Ratings used so far refer to the creditworthiness of banks’ senior unsecured debt.
These are so-called ‘all-in’ ratings because they incorporate the likelihood that a gov-
ernment bails out creditors. As discussed in Section 7.3, the rating bias in favour of
larger banks might instead reflect agencies’ rational assessment of the likelihood of
government support, which depends partly on bank size.
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We test the robustness of our results to the effect of government support by exploit-
ing a different type of credit rating. Fitch and Moody’s publish ‘bank financial
strength ratings’, which assess banks’ creditworthiness as independent stand-alone
entities, absent reliance on government guarantees. The rank difference between the
‘all-in’ and ‘stand-alone’ ratings describes the improvement in creditworthiness due to
Table 7. Robustness check for different lags between EDF and credit rating
Dependent variable
Lag (in quarters)
Non-Directional error: TORQS Directional error: DORQS
0 4 12 0 4 12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size
Log assets 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.022*** 0.040*** 0.036 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Securitization
ASSB 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agency dummies
Moody’s 0.010 0.018 0.021 0.050** 0.043* 0.056 **
(0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027)
S&P 0.020 0.016 0.008 0.074*** 0.090*** 0.086 ***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026)
Profitability
RoA 0.021*** 0.005 0.003 0.010*** 0.004* 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Capital structure
Leverage 0.260*** 0.064 0.069 0.111*** 0.083** 0.069
(0.070) (0.066) (0.077) (0.036) (0.038) (0.045)
Asset structure
Loans share 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trading share 6.050*** 4.053** 3.569 0.882 1.096 4.322***
(2.063) (2.009) (2.673) (1.000) (1.073) (1.507)
Funding structure
Short-term
funding share
0.011 0.033 0.009 0.026 0.003 0.103***
(0.051) (0.047) (0.053) (0.029) (0.030) (0.035)
Rating Competition
Multiple rating
dummy
0.010 0.014 0.002 0.025** 0.034*** 0.017
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
HH index 0.008 0.341 1.017** 0.144 0.131 0.141
(0.461) (0.425) (0.437) (0.239) (0.245) (0.251)
Av. serial correlation 0.748 0.755 0.769 0.851 0.859 0.861
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No No No No No
No. of observations 18,615 17,274 13,578 18,615 15,426 13,578
Note: Reported are panel regressions with bank level random effects. The regressions allows for serial AR(1)
correlation of the error. the independent variables are: Log assets = natural log of a bank’s on balance-sheet assets
in USD; ASSB = agency specific securitization business (business volume between agency and bank measured in
logs); Agency dummies for Moody’s and S&P are 1 if the rating is from the respective agency and 0 otherwise;
RoA = return on average assets; Leverage = assets divided by equity all divided by 100; Loans share = total loans
divided by total assets; Trading share = net profits on trading and derivatives divided by total assets; Short-term
funding share = deposits and short-term funding divided by total assets; Multiple rating dummy = dummy taking
the value 1 if a bank is rated by more than one agency, 0 otherwise; HH index = Herfindahl–Hirschmann index
for concentration in the market for bank ratings. Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported.
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 8. Robustness check for the effect of government support
Dependent variable
Non-directional error:
TORQS Directional error: DORQS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size
Log assets 0.013 0.009 0.048*** 0.044***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Securitization
ASSB 0.002 0.002 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Government support
Rank difference: ‘all-in’
minus ‘stand-alone’
0.181*** 0.326***
(0.039) (0.024)
Profitability
RoA 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital structure
Leverage 0.071 0.076 0.009 0.022
(0.094) (0.094) (0.058) (0.057)
Asset structure
Loans share 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Trading share 6.424** 5.831** 1.516 0.108
(2.974) (2.973) (1.747) (1.725)
Funding structure
Short-term funding share 0.020 0.033 0.006 0.025
(0.069) (0.069) (0.047) (0.045)
Rating competition
Multiple rating dummy 0.019 0.020 0.012 0.014
(0.028) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018)
HH index 0.158 0.021 0.539 0.098
(0.723) (0.723) (0.450) (0.444)
Av. serial correlation 0.758 0.782 0.855 0.855
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No No No
No. of observations 7,488 7,488 7,488 7,488
Note: Reported are panel regressions with bank level random effects. The regression allows for serial AR(1) corre-
lation of the error. This table excludes S&P ratings, since S&P did not produce bank financial strength ratings
until 2011. The independent variables are: Log assets = natural log of a bank’s on balance-sheet assets in USD;
ASSB = agency specific securitization business (business volume between agency and bank measured in logs);
Directional rank difference = difference between the rank of a bank’s senior unsecured debt rating and the rank
of a bank’s individual (stand-alone) rating, normalized by sample size; RoA = return on average assets; Leverage
= assets divided by equity all divided by 100; Loans share = total loans divided by total assets; Trading share =
net profits on trading and derivatives divided by total assets; Short-term funding share = deposits and short-term
funding divided by total assets; Multiple rating dummy = dummy taking the value 1 if a bank is rated by more
than one agency, 0 otherwise; HH index = Herfindahl–Hirschmann index for concentration in the market for
bank ratings. Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported. The symbols *, **, and *** repres-
ent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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implicit government support.18 We define the improvement from the ‘stand-alone’ to
the ‘all-in’ credit rating rank (of the same bank) as Rank difference. The Rank difference
variable is positive when a bank’s stand-alone rating rank is better than its all-in rating
rank. In general, we would expect that large banks are more likely to benefit from
conditional government support, since large banks are more likely to be perceived as
systemically important. We observe as such in our data: there is a positive correlation
of the Rank difference variable with bank size, measured by Log assets, of 0.31.
Table 8 explores the alternative hypothesis that our finding of positive bias in
favour of large banks might be caused by omission of the likelihood of government
support. ‘Stand-alone’ ratings are available to us from Moody’s and Fitch on a sub-
sample of banks, such that the regressions reported in Table 8 are run on a reduced
sample of 7,488 bank-rating observations, 49% of the full sample. Columns (1) and (3)
repeat the analysis from Table 6, columns (2) and (5) for all Fitch and Moody’s rated
banks. Columns (2) and (4) use these same specifications plus the Rank difference vari-
able. In the reduced sample of Moody’s and Fitch ratings in specification (3), the Log
assets variable shows a significant coefficient of 0.048 for rating error DORQS, com-
pared with 0.042 in Table 6, column (5).
Including the Rank difference in specifications (2) and (4) slightly reduces the regres-
sion coefficient for Log assets to 0.013 and 0.044 respectively. But statistical and eco-
nomic significance in column (4) remains high. The coefficient for Rank difference has
the expected positive sign and is also statistically significant. We conclude for the Fitch
and Moody’s ratings that only an economically small part of the substantial rating bias
in favour of large banks can be attributed to implicit government guarantees.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The ongoing financial and banking crises have shifted rating agencies and the quality
of their opinions into the centre of the policy arena. The issue of rating quality is close-
ly connected to a larger debate about bank regulation, which is often founded on
rating-contingent bank capital requirements. To inform this debate, the current paper
contributes with a number of stylized empirical facts about the quality of bank ratings.
We ground our analysis on the premise that it is inherently difficult to predict the
timing and intensity of a systemic banking crisis. This insight informs our strictly or-
dinal definition of rating quality. In our analysis, it is not the absolute (cardinal) level
of default risk that matters, but rather the rank order of default risk among all banks.
We then apply this ordinal approach to a large database on bank ratings issued by the
three major rating agencies over the period 1990 to 2011. The corresponding meas-
18 Stand-alone ratings use somewhat different notation to their all-in counterparts. Moody’s rates banks
A, A–, B+ B, B–, etc. through C and D. Fitch rates banks A, A/B, B, B/C etc. through C, D and F. For
the purposes of the ranking, we judged, for example, that A– rated banks were relatively safer than A/B
rated banks which were relatively safer than B– rated banks.
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ure of bank distress is the expected default frequency (EDF) measured by the widely
used Merton model of corporate default. We draw our EDF measures directly from
Moody’s in order to avoid any parameter choices that might bias the rating quality
metric against a finding of high rating quality.
Our first insight concerns overall ratings quality. We show that bank ratings in the
upper investment grade range bear no substantial ordinal relationship to expected default
probabilities two years later. The Spearman rank correlation between the credit rating
rank and the EDF rank is even slightly negative when EDFs are measured outside cri-
ses. This finding runs contrary to risk-weights applied in the standardized approach to
credit risk under the first pillar of the Basel II accord. Under these Basel recommenda-
tions, exposures to financial institutions are assigned a 20% risk-weight if the external
credit rating is between AAA and AA–; a 50% risk-weight if the external rating is
between A+ and A–; and a 100% risk-weight for the lowest investment grade ratings
from BBB+ to BBB–. These risk-weights are used by national bank regulators to deter-
mine whether banks meet minimum regulatory capital requirements. But such large
step-changes in risk weights cannot be reconciled with our evidence that the AAA to
AA– bucket is statistically indistinguishable from the A+ to A– bucket in terms of pre-
dicting future EDF rankings. This discrepancy is likely to generate substantial distor-
tions. To the extent that minimum regulatory capital requirements bind, we expect
banks to hold more exposure to other banks rated AAA to AA– compared with banks
rated A+ to A–. These Basel II risk-weights thus distort interbank markets and
entrench the market position of banks rated AA– and above. We also highlight the
countercyclical nature of rating quality. The information content of ratings increases
during a financial crisis. If the expected default risk is measured during a crisis period,
even bank ratings in the investment grade range become somewhat informative. The
Spearman correlation between the credit rating rank and EDF rank is 14% for the top
third of rating observations. In an ordinal (rather than cardinal) sense, credit ratings
become more meaningful at the onset of a financial crisis.
Second, our analysis reveals systematic relationships between the direction (bias) of
the rating error and bank size: large banks obtain systematically more favourable
credit ratings relative to their expected default risk measured two years later. This bias
is most likely related to rating agencies’ conflict of interest, which increases with bank
size. At the extreme, large banks with economic power might become ‘too big to
downgrade’ for the rating agency. In small part, the distortion in large banks’ ratings
can be attributed to more substantial government guarantees for large banks. But
results presented in Table 8 indicate that, at least for the subsample of Fitch and Moo-
dy’s rated banks, the finding of rating error and rating bias in favour of large banks is
robust to the inclusion of government guarantees. Overall, the rating bias distorts the
financing costs of large banks and reinforces the creation of ‘too big to fail banks’
devoid of economic rationale.
Third, new information from the Thomson Reuters Dealogic database is used to
map the bilateral business relations in securitization issuance between banks and
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the three major rating agencies over the period 1990–2012. We define a bank’s agency-
specific securitization business (ASSB) and show that it has significant explanatory power
for the rating bias even after controlling for many bank characteristics. In other words:
the more a bank used a particular rating agency for rating its asset-backed securities
at issuance, the more this agency rewarded the bank with a better bank credit rating.
We consider that this represents evidence suggesting that conflicts of interest in the
securitization business compromised the quality of bank credit ratings.
In light of the shortcomings in the current rating process, public policy should
encourage alternative sources of credit rating information. Recent work by Bloechlin-
ger et al. (2012) shows that one can produce corporate credit rating measures at par or
superior to those of the credit rating agencies at almost no cost, using public informa-
tion only. The latter suggests that the three largest rating agencies owe their predom-
inance in the market for corporate ratings more to regulatory privilege than
information advantage. With the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, which aims to reduce
regulatory reliance on rating agencies, some segments of the rating market might
become low-cost commodities in the future, dominated by not-for-profit organizations.
In order to reduce the cost of processing bank accounting information, banks’ pub-
lic reporting requirements should be vastly enhanced to facilitate cheaper and better
credit analysis. Those reporting requirements are still heterogeneous across countries.
A number of countries do not require quarterly financial statements for non-listed
banks and provide significant room for manoeuvre to allocate certain items to the
trading or banking book (Huizinga and Laeven, 2009). In most countries, bank regu-
lators protect their privileged data access, and do not share crucial bank data publicly
(or even with other bank regulators) in a narrow pursuit of their own agency power
and to shield themselves from accountability. Future bank regulation therefore needs
to create an entirely new information environment for external credit analysis. Better
public information and more bank reporting is the best strategy to reduce the exor-
bitant influence of rating agencies in the current system.
Discussion
Isabel Schnabel
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
In the recent financial crisis, credit rating agencies were heavily criticized for having
failed to recognize the build-up of risks in the banking sector. This paper asks whether
rating agencies at least predicted the ordering of banks’ riskiness correctly, even if they
failed to predict the crisis itself. To this end, the authors compare the ranking of
banks’ credit ratings by the three major rating agencies with the ranking of their
expected default frequencies two years later. They also analyse which factors deter-
mine the size of rating errors (deviations in either direction) and rating biases (devi-
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ations in a particular direction) by developing ordinal measures of rating errors and
biases, and by regressing these measures on bank- and country-specific variables.
The authors find that ratings poorly reflect the ordering of banks’ creditworthiness,
especially in non-crisis times and for investment grade banks. Moreover, rating errors
and biases are found to be higher for large banks, and rating biases (but not errors)
are higher for banks with a larger securitization volume at a given rating agency. Both
results are interpreted as evidence of conflicts of interest in rating agencies.
Ordinal versus cardinal ratings
The paper’s emphasis on the ordinal aspect of credit ratings is a welcome addition to
the literature. As mentioned in the paper, rating agencies themselves do not seem to
have a clear perception of whether ratings should be considered ordinal or cardinal.19
In reality, they are likely to be both. For example, a rating of AAA does not only mean
that a bank belongs to the group of best banks, but it also suggests high creditworthi-
ness in an absolute sense. Standard & Poor’s describe a company rated AAA as having
an ‘extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments’, which clearly is an
absolute, rather than a relative statement about a firm’s creditworthiness. If there were
no absolute meaning to ratings, current banking regulation, which binds regulatory
capital requirements to ratings, would be entirely inappropriate. While acknowledging
that the relative (ordinal) aspect of ratings is important, absolute (cardinal) aspects can-
not be fully discarded.
One interesting finding in the paper is the better ability of rating agencies to predict
the ordering of banks in times of crisis and the ordering of below-investment-grade
banks. While this result is surprising at first sight, it may partly be driven by the larger
heterogeneity of banks in the respective time period or bank group, which makes it
much easier to generate a reliable ranking. If banks are homogenous, small errors in
the measurement of creditworthiness can translate into relatively large ranking devi-
ations. It is not clear whether the same result would be found if a cardinal metric of
rating errors were used.
Conflicts of interest versus bad judgment
One argument of the authors for focusing on ordinal ratings is that financial crises are
hard to predict, whereas ordinal rankings are less affected by the occurrence of crises.
While the first statement is certainly true, the second is not. A financial crisis does not
affect all banks to the same degree. A bank’s vulnerability to systemic risk (e.g., its
interconnectedness or its degree of correlation with other banks) may be just as diffi-
cult to predict as the crisis itself. Similarly, regulatory interventions in a crisis do not
19 Following the authors, we call ratings cardinal if they can be mapped into absolute levels of credit risk.
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affect all banks in the same way and cannot easily be predicted. The different treat-
ment of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers is a case in point. Hence, the ordering of
banks is likely to change in a financial crisis, which may partly explain observed rating
biases. Thus, the overrating of large banks could also be explained by an underestima-
tion of large banks’ exposures to systemic risk arising from their interconnectedness in
interbank markets or their strong reliance on market funding. The overvaluation of
banks with high volumes of securitization could have been due to an insufficient
appreciation of the risks from this type of business. Even though the paper uses
agency-specific securitization volumes, it does not control for overall securitization
volumes. Therefore, it cannot isolate the effect of conflicts of interest. Hence, the
analysis cannot identify whether the observed overvaluation of certain types of banks
was a deliberate action of rating agencies due to conflicts of interest, or whether it
was simply bad judgment. The paper strongly pushes the first interpretation, but the
second one cannot be ruled out.
This problem arises because the employed measures of rating errors mix the meas-
urement aspect of ratings (i.e., the relationship between ratings and currently expected
default frequencies) and the ability of ratings to forecast future developments, which is
inherently difficult in times of crises, not least due to potential structural breaks in the
time series. Table 7 gives some insights into the implications of this distinction by con-
sidering different forecasting horizons. As expected, rating biases are significantly
smaller if one considers a horizon of 0, but they are still there. A further investigation
of this issue would be useful.
Overall, it seems difficult to draw clear policy conclusions from the analysis. The
suitability of credit ratings for regulatory capital requirements would have to be ana-
lysed using a cardinal rating metric since the reliance on ratings in regulation can only
be justified if ratings have some absolute meaning, that is, if they can be mapped into
absolute levels of credit risk. Regarding rating agencies’ conflicts of interest, the ana-
lysis does not clearly distinguish between deliberate biases and bad judgment. Never-
theless, the emphasis of the paper on the ordinal aspects of ratings and the distinction
between rating errors and biases improve our understanding of ratings and will cer-
tainly stimulate further research on rating accuracy and the question whether regula-
tion should continue to rely so strongly on rating agencies’ judgments.
Thorsten Beck
CentER, Tilburg University
This paper shows that (i) credit ratings of banks are only able to predict expected
default frequency during crisis but not normal times, (ii) bank ratings in the upper
investment grade range are not able to predict bank fragility, (iii) large banks receive
more favorable credit ratings relative to their expected default frequency, and (iv)
banks with a large securitization business with a specific rating agency receive more
favourable credit ratings from this agency relative to their expected default frequency.
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It is important to stress that these last two results clearly reflect biases and not simply
prediction errors. This is a very policy relevant and timely paper as we are still in the
midst of the regulatory reform debate. The role of credit rating agencies, especially
their regulatory role in determining risk weights, is subject to heavy debate and this
paper adds to this policy discussion.
Let me first offer some comments on the findings. The results that there is no
high correlation between credit ratings and EDF among investment grade banks
and in non-crisis times does not seem surprising, for several reasons. First, as the
authors point out themselves, bank failure is a rare event, especially in non-crisis
times. And as the authors focus on relative ratings, the distance between contiguous
risk categories will be less accurately measured in non-crisis times when the average
risk of bank failure is miniscule. Second, shocks might come from unexpected cor-
ners unrelated to factors that make it into the risk ratings. Only after these shocks
have been realized, will they be reflected in risk ratings and the latter be updated
accordingly.
The policy recommendations of the authors make sense. While rating agencies and
their regulatory privilege was for a long time seen as part of the market discipline
agenda, their shortcomings, both in risk modelling per se and in their incentive struc-
ture, have become clear. Even if the incentive problems can be addressed, the lack of
predictability of shocks remains a problem, so that reduced reliance on rating agencies
is called for. More transparency in banks’ financial statements, as advocated by the
authors, can help broaden the number of informed observers.
A more general conclusion one can draw is that very sophisticated models of cap-
turing risk and reflecting them in capital risk weights is the wrong approach, which
might give the illusion of improved regulation without actually providing it, a point
recently also made by Andrew Haldane. Focusing on a set of simpler rules including
an incentive compatible bank resolution framework seems a more promising route to
financial stability than ever more refined risk weights for capital requirements. And
addressing especially the too-big-to-fail phenomenon head-on through living wills and
special resolution regime for SIFIs can also help alleviate the rating bias reported by
the authors.
Panel discussion
Fabiano Schivardi asked if the orthogonality between CR rankings and future EDF
rankings could be due to regulatory institutions acting (specifically between years t
and t+2) on the information provided by bank CR rankings today. Johannes Spinne-
wijn was surprised by the use of the 45 degree line as the benchmark in the analysis of
the correlation between CR and future EDF rankings given that it ignores the role
played by uncertainty in the discrepancy between the two. He maintained that it is
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never possible to perfectly correlate an ex-ante risk assessment with the ex-post realiza-
tion.
Clemens Fuest noted that if rating agencies were abusing their powers and leading
banks into bankruptcies, then one could argue the opposite of what the graphs of
future EDF versus CR ratings are indicating. In the presence of this endogeneity, he
thought that it would be better to focus on the contemporaneous relationship between
the two sets of rankings.
Harald Hau agreed that a cardinal approach would yield more information. How-
ever, by adopting the minimalistic ordinal metric, they were erring on the side of cau-
tion. In particular, doing so results in more robust conclusions and not having to
make parameter assumptions. Regarding structural breaks, Hau clarified that any
shift in the distribution would be captured by the time fixed effects. On the other
hand, according to Hau a problem arises if these breaks are in some way interacting
with bank characteristics. Hau said that in this instance they could identify the breaks
and look at subsamples, though he would not expect to find qualitatively different
results. He admitted that obtaining evidence in support of breaks generating the
effects would be troubling. David Marques-Ibanez agreed with Schnabel about form-
ing conclusions on the basis of the ‘conflicts of interest’ argument. He added that the
banks may have been securitizing more before the crisis which in turn could have
made it more difficult for the agencies to assess the quality of the banks. With respect
to size though, he claimed that the results are particularly robust. Summing up, he
thought that the issue of endogeneity is not very relevant in their analysis given that
they are concerned with forecasting.
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